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hen the prime ministers of Serbia and Kosovo reached their first agreement on the 
principles governing the normalisation of relations, they not only settled long-
standing ethnic enmities in the north of the former Serbian province, they also 
handed Catherine Ashton a diplomatic victory she badly needed. This was proof of the 
added value of the European External Action Service (EEAS) as a new EU foreign policy 
actor. 
Plagued by criticism for its slow start, weak internal organisation, failures to link up with 
certain Commission services, inflated salaries and holiday entitlements, the EEAS has come 
under fire recently from the European Parliament’s Budget Committee, amid reports of 
irregularities in the procurement procedure of a private security firm’s services to protect the 
EU Delegation in Kabul. None of this reflects well on the EEAS, especially given the 
wholesale review of the organisation and functioning of the Service by member states, the 
Parliament and other stakeholders that is currently underway. 
Ever since the creation of the EEAS in January 2011, members of the Service, and indeed 
Ashton herself, have been at pains to show the added value of the new EU body. Success 
could only be defined in somewhat elusive terms: the constructive role played by the EEAS 
in the wake of revolutionary protests in the Arab world; the crisis response coordination by 
EU delegations in third countries hit by calamity or crisis (e.g. the Fukushima nuclear 
disaster), and the comprehensive approach to tackling complex security and development 
crises (in the Horn of Africa and Sahel region, for example). 
Another success story was that Ashton, supported by the EEAS, was able to keep the ‘P5+1’ 
together in nuclear non-proliferation talks with Iran. Sadly, these talks fizzled out in April 
during the latest round of negotiations in Almaty, and perhaps with them the international 
consortium of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council + Germany – thereby 
tarnishing the image of the EU as a new peacemaker on the world stage. 
But the agreement between Belgrade and Pristina is a clear-cut and resounding diplomatic 
success for the EEAS, enabling it to dispel some of this recent criticism.  
Significantly, the new deal offers the possibility to close yet another chapter in the recent 
violent history of the Balkans. Bringing arch rivals Ivica Dačić, a former spokesman of the 
late Serbian strongman Slobodan Milošević, and Hashim Thaçi, former commander of the 
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Kosovo Liberation Army – both now prime ministers of their respective countries – to the 
table for direct talks and towards an accord in barely seven months is no small diplomatic 
feat. It not only sends a strong signal to the countries in the region, but also to the UN, the 
US, Russia, China and other global players that the EU is serious about stabilising its 
immediate neighbourhood. And a worthy laureate of the 2012 Nobel Peace Prize. 
Much credit for the positive outcome of the EU facilitated dialogue has to go to Catherine 
Ashton herself. Her leadership and dedication were critical to bringing about this important 
agreement. Declaring an end to the formal discussions when the parties failed to reach an 
agreement in the eighth round of the EU facilitated dialogue on April 2nd, Ashton sent Dačić  
and Thaçi home with the message that the onus lay with them. If they wanted Commissioner 
Füle and herself to advise the Council to open the door to closer relations with the EU, then 
they had about two weeks ‘to step over their own long shadows’ and rally their 
constituencies behind a compromise. Ashton gambled and won. Two more rounds of talks 
under her leadership were needed to hammer out a deal, sanctioned by the General Affairs 
Council of April 22nd. The agreement will partly define Ashton’s legacy as the first High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the Commission. 
To be fair, this was no solo effort. The first meeting of the dialogue foreseen in UN General 
Assembly Resolution 298 was in fact held on 8-9 March 2011, with the facilitation of a small 
team led by Robert Cooper, then counsellor of Ashton. Over the course of 12 months, Cooper 
chaired nine meetings at the level of heads of delegation. Further gatherings were held in 
various technical working groups. In this first phase of the EU facilitated dialogue, both sides 
struck agreements in a number of areas: civil registry; freedom of movement; acceptance of 
university and school diplomas; customs stamps and cadastral records; and integrated 
border management. The agreement on regional representation and cooperation of 24 
February 2012 allowed Kosovo – under the new denomination ‘Kosovo*’1 to participate and 
sign new agreements on its own account and to speak for itself at all regional meetings. 
The EU facilitated dialogue was suspended for six months to take account of the May 2012 
general and presidential elections in Serbia. The electoral victory of the nationalist SNS party 
led Ashton to ratchet up the pressure to strike a deal. The thinking was that any agreement 
concluded by the two countries’ nationalists would have the greatest chance of sustaining 
the pressures of domestic politics and time. Hence the decision to invite the political leaders 
themselves, and not just their envoys, to participate in the second phase of the EU facilitated 
dialogue. The main incentive Ashton used to wheedle Kosovo towards an agreement was the 
possible opening of negotiations on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement. Serbia was 
offered the prospect of starting membership talks with the EU. Both the Commission and the 
member states, most vocally Germany, backed Ashton by warning the parties that they 
would not hesitate to push back the April date for a Council decision if either failed to 
commit fully to the negotiations. 
It is therefore not only the outcome that makes the EU facilitated dialogue stand out as a 
success, but also the characteristics of the diplomatic process itself: it was high level, high on 
                                                      
1 “This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSC 1244 and the 
ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo Declaration of Independence”. The 26-word footnote had required close to 
two-and-a-half days of almost uninterrupted negotiations to finalise. It is striking that the agreement 
on the principles governing the normalisation of relations of April 19th, initialled by the prime 
minister of Serbia and approved by his government and the national assembly of Serbia, does not 
reproduce the asterisk when it mentions Kosovo. This seems to suggest that the name issue will only 
crop up in a regional context.  
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symbolism (e.g. the Ashton-Clinton trip to the Balkans at the outset of the dialogue in 
October 2012), high paced (the EEAS ran a tight schedule with high-level negotiation rounds 
every month), and high on drama (cf. Ashton’s obvious disappointment that Dačić and Thaçi 
failed to conclude an agreement as a birthday present for her in March). 
The facilitated dialogue also shows that, in spite of its image as a latter-day Eldorado marred 
by deep economic and financial crises, the EU still has enough power of attraction to 
convince third states to settle their disputes peacefully in return for the prospect of closer 
relations with the Union.  